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@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @
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IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!
Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!
It is also possible that the RSA host key has just been changed.
The fingerprint for the RSA key sent by the remote host is
10:6b:89:c6:32:0f:37:88:42:4a:f4:14:09:5c:84:2e.
Please contact your system administrator.
Add correct host key in /home/user/.ssh/known_hosts to get rid of this message.
Offending key in /home/user/.ssh/known_hosts:39
RSA host key for 192.168.5.4 has changed and you have requested strict checking.
Host key verification failed.
ssh-keygen -R 192.168.5.4
/root/.ssh/known_hosts updated.
Original contents retained as /root/.ssh/known_hosts.old
Use ssh pub key authencation based on our guide here.
Public key authentication is a highly secure method used in SSH communication. When used correctly, even with a man-in-the-middle (MITM) present, it should still provide robust security. However, there are caveats.
The essence of public key authentication is in the pair of keys: the private key, which you keep secret, and the public key, which you share. When a client (user) connects to a server, the server encrypts a random message using the user's public key. The user must then decrypt this message using their private key and send it back to the server. If the server can verify the decrypted message, it authenticates the user.
Here's why it's secure against MITM attacks:
Private keys stay private: The user's private key, needed to decrypt messages, is never shared or transmitted. Even if a MITM intercepts the communication, they cannot get the private key.
Public keys are...public: A MITM can see your public key, but it's designed to be shared. They can't derive your private key from it or use it to authenticate as you.
non-matching hostkey can, on one hand, signal a substantial security risk like a man-in-the-middle attack. On the other hand, it might simply indicate that a new server is now using that IP address or a reinstall has taken place, leading to a perfectly legitimate change in the hostkey. The key here is to understand and verify the situation before assuming.
When a device connects to a server via Secure Shell (SSH), it identifies the server using a cryptographic entity known as the hostkey. This key is stored in the device's list of known hosts (located in .ssh/known_hosts), and it's used for subsequent connections to the same server.
The error means that the key provided by the server is different from the one stored on the connecting device. This discrepancy can raise alarms since it often implies that you may not be connecting to the server you believe you are, or you are speaking to a malicious intermediary.
The most dreaded risk associated with a non-matching hostkey is the possibility of a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. In this scenario, a malevolent entity intercepts the communication between the client and server, posing as the server to the client and vice versa. The goal is often to gather sensitive data or introduce malicious code.
Non-matching hostkeys can also indicate a server spoofing attack where an attacker sets up a fake server to trick users into providing sensitive information, again pointing to a significant cybersecurity threat.
Despite the apparent dangers, a non-matching hostkey isn't always indicative of malicious activity. Often, it could be due to an innocent change in the server's infrastructure, like a new server using the IP address or the reinstallation of an existing server.
Dynamic IP addresses, where the IP address changes from time to time, are quite common in many network environments. If a new server comes online and happens to receive an IP address previously associated with a different server, you would see a non-matching hostkey when trying to connect.
Another benign possibility is when the server has been reinstalled or its operating system has been upgraded. In such cases, a new hostkey is generated, which would not match the previous one stored on client devices. Again, this situation represents a legitimate and non-malicious reason for a non-matching hostkey.
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